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THE LIABILITY OF SOCIAL HOSTS FOR THEIR
INTOXICATED GUESTS' AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS - AN
EXTENSION OF THE LAW
There is a national trend toward raising minimum drinking ages and im-
posing harsher drunken driving laws.' Drunken driving has killed over 250,000
people in the past ten years, averaging 25,000 lives per year. According to na-
tional statistics, an alcohol-related traffic fatality occurs every twenty
minutes.' As of January, 1981, fourteen states raised their minimum-age drink-
ing laws,' and only twenty-eight states now permit drinking by persons under
twenty-one years.' Further, in the summer of 1984, Congress passed a statute
which rewards states with more highway funds if they raise the minimum
drinking age to twenty-one.,
As a result of this trend, injured victims are looking for ways to recover
damages for their injuries. One method has existed since before Prohibition.
For years, injured victims used dram shop acts or a common law negligence
theory to recover from a business proprietor who served the minor or the in-
toxicated individual. Recently, injured victims have attempted to sue social
hosts who served the tort-feasor. The cause of action against a private host
evolved from a trend of holding taverns or business proprietors liable, but two
major points have developed. First, courts are limiting the holdings to the facts
of the cases. For example, many courts first impose liability on servers of
minors and wait for a case involving an adult to develop. Other courts refuse to
hold the server of an adult liable while leaving the door open in the case of a
minor. These limited decisions have probably arisen because of public policy
concerns. Second, courts are struggling to interpret the dram shop acts and liq-
uor control statutes in order to apply them to social hosts. The cases are usual-
ly overruled by the legislature, resulting in controversy between legislatures
and courts over this issue. For these reasons, a cause of action predicated on
traditional negligence principles is the best way to impose liability. The New
Jersey Supreme Court recently used common law negligence principles to hold
a social host liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an accident with a
drunken guest.7 This decision has raised many fears about serving liquor at a
private party.
This comment will first address the historical trend leading to the liability
'Coleman Jr., The Right Motive. but the Wrong Solution. 70 A.B.A.J. 18 lApril, 19841.
'Comment, DWI Laws: Getting Tough on Drunks. 28 S.D.L. REV. 491 119831.
lid. at 491.
'Williams, Zador, Harris, and Karpf, The Ejfect of Raising the Legal Minimum Drinking Age on Involve-
ment in Fatal Crashes. 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 169 11983).
'Making it Tougher to Drink and Drive. NEWSWEEK. July 9, 1984, at 23.
'National Minimum Drinking Age, Pub. L. No. 98-363, § 158, 98 Stat. 437 119841.
'Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984 .
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of social hosts. It will then address the three ways an injured victim might
allege a cause of action, and will discuss the problems and implications of
holdings of liability of each theory.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE - DRAM SHOP ACTS
According to the traditional common law rule, it was not a tort to serve a
person an alcoholic beverage; therefore, a person injured by an intoxicated in-
dividual did not have a cause of action against the person who served the liq-
uor.' The courts reasoned that the proximate cause of injury was the drinking
of liquor and not the furnishing of it.9 While most of these cases discussed the
possible liability of one who supplied the liquor for sale, some courts addressed
the liability of one who gratuitously provided the alcohol.'"
The times leading to Prohibition had a direct impact on this rule. The
movement began as far back as 1850, but three waves of temperance reform
resulted in the passage of National Prohibition by the Eighteenth Amendment
in 1920." The prohibitionists also lobbied state legislators to pass dram shop
acts (or civil damages acts) to provide a statutory cause of action against the
person selling the liquor.'2 Thirty-seven states have at one time had some form
of dram shop act imposing liability.3 After Prohibition was repealed in 1933,
few states continued statewide prohibition. By 1966, all had abandoned it.'
The states also began to repeal the dram shop acts." In 1966 and 1967, twenty-
two states had a dram shop act. This number was reduced to twenty in 1972.16
Today, seventeen states have such acts;'7 however, some of the recent statutes
'Eg.. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31 6th Cir.) cert. denied. 382 U.S. 831 11965); Campbell v. Village of
Silver Bay, 315 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1963): Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 11965); Brockett v.
Kitchen Boyd Motor (o., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 11972): Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d
392, 187 N.E.2d 292 11963). See also 45 AM. JoR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors 2/3 553, n. II. (1969). In the
absence of statute, the consumer of intoxicants was unable to recover against the person furnishing the
drinks for personal injuries resulting from the inebriation. Campbell. 315 F.2d at 573. See also Lee v.
Peerless Ins. Co.. 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 11966). Annot. 54 ALR. 2d 1152 119571.
'Colligan. 38 III. App. 2d at 412, 187 N.E.2d at 300 lquoting 30 Am Jur. Intoxicating Liquors, § 520): Carr.
238 Ark. at 890, 385 S.W.2d at 657: Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 119661 (quoting 30 Am.
Jur. Intoxicating Liquors, § 5201: see generally 45 Am Jur. 2d, supra note 8, infra n. 12 and 13.
'"E.g. (ruse v. Aden, 127 III. 231, 20 N.E. 73 11889): Harris v. Hardesty, III Kan. 291. 207 P. 188 119221:
see also Annot. 8 A.L.R. 3d 1412 119661.
"See. e.g. C. MFR/. THE DRY DE(AI)E. 2-5 119311.
'2See. e.g. Ogilvie, History' and Appraisal oJ the Illinois Dram Shop Act. 1958 U. IL i- L. F. 175 (19581: 12 AM.
JUR. TRIA Ls 729, Dramshop Litigation: Note, Sicial Host Liability,(or Injuries Caused by the Acts oJan In-
toxicated Guest. 59 N.D. L. REv. 445 (1983).
"McGough, Dram Shop Acts. A.B.A. SEt. OF INS. NEI. & COMPENSArION L. 448, 451 119671.
"18 EN(YCLOPEDA BRIrANNI'A. 609, 612 119641.
Comment. Dram Shop Liability - A Judicial Response. 57 Calif. L. Rev. 995 11969).
'"Note, Extension oJ1the Dram Shop Act: New Found Liability ojfthe Social Host. 49 N.D.L. Rev. 67, 70
(1972).
'_See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1977): ALASKA SrAr. § 04.21.030 (1980): COLO. REV. STA'r. § 13-21-103 (1973:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 lWest 1975): ILL. ANN. SrAr. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984): IOWA
CoitE ANN. § 123.92 IWest Supp. 1984): ME. REv. SrAr ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (19831: MICH COMP. LAWS.
[Vol. !18:3
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provide that the server will not be liable." No state without a pre-existing dram
shop act imposing liability has adopted one since 1935.t9
THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE
Different occurrences led to the adoption of a new common law negli-
gence theory, making it possible for the injured victim to recover from the tav-
ern proprietor. First and most obvious, a majority of the states had no statute
upon which a claim could rest. Next, intoxicated individuals were still inflict-
ing damage which in some cases exceeded the amount that an intoxicated tort-
feasor could compensate." The taverns were clearly the deep pockets.2 Final-
ly, the remaining dram shop acts did not cover all situations. The courts in
these jurisdictions had to determine whether the statutes were exclusive, or
whether the common law could fill in gaps not covered by the statutes.
Courts willing to change the common law rule were faced with two major
obstacles. The traditional rule was based on the theory that the tavernkeeper
owed no duty to the injured party and the theory that the proximate cause of
the injury was the drinking of alcohol and not the serving of it. Courts would
have to reexamine these theories. However, all states have enacted liquor con-
trol laws22 either prohibiting the sale or furnishing of alcohol to minors,23 or to
ANN. § 436.22 (West Supp. 1984): MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984): N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
I 1-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983): N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983): OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4399.01 (Page 1982): PA. STAT. ANN. tit.47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1969)" R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1 (1976): UTAH
CODE ANN. § 32-11-I (Supp. 1983): VT. SrAT. ANN. tit.7 § 501 (1972).
"bSee e.g. CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Supp. 1984): CA. CIVIL CODE § 1714 )Supp. 1984): COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 47,4-497 (Purdon, 1969).
"McGough, supra note 13, at 45 1.
2
'Note, Liquor Vendor Liability for Injuries Caused by Intoxicated Patrons - A Question of Policy. 35
OHIO ST. L.J. 630,631 (1974).
2 I1d.
2See ALA. CODE §§ 28-7-21, 28-3-260 (1977 & Supp. 1984): ALASKA SrAT. § 04.16.051 (1980): ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241,4-244(D) (I 1974); ARK. SIAT. ANN. §§ 48-529, 48-902.I, 48-903 (19771; CA. Bus. & PROF
CODE §§ 25602, 25658 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-47-128 (1978 & Supp. 1984):
CONN. GEN. STAT_ § 30-86 (West 1975 & West Supp. 1984): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 713 (Supp. 1984), D.C.
CODE ANN. § 25-121 (Supp. 1984): FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 562.11, 562.50 (West Supp. 1983), GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-3-22, 3-3-23 (1982): HAWAII REV. STAT. § 281-78 (1976): IDAHO CODE §§ 23-312, 23-929 (1977: ILL.
ANN. STAT. Ch. 43, § 131 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984): IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8, 7.1-5-10-14, 7.1-5-10,
7.1-5-10-15 (1982 & West Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.49 (West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
41-715 1981): KY. REV. STAT. § 244-080 (Baldwin 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:91 26:88, 26:683 (West
1974 & West Supp. 1984): ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28, §§ 303, 1058 (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118
(Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 138, §§ 34, 69 (West 1974 and West Supp. 1984)- MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 436.29, 436.33 (1978 and Supp. 1984(; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (West 1972 and West
Supp. 1984): MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-81, 67-1-83 (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon 1963);
MONT_ CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-304, 45-5-624 (1983): NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §
202.055 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (Supp. 1983): N.J. STAT. ANN. 33:1-39,1-77 (West Supp.
1984): N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7A-16, 60-7B-I (1978); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970&
McKinney Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE 5-01-09 (1975); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4301.69 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 537 (West Supp. 1984(: Or. REV. STAT. §
471.410 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Purdon 1969 & Purdon Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
3-8-I-, 3-8-6 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-990 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
35-4-78, 35-9-1 (1977 & Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-4-203 (Supp. 1984): TEX. ALcO. BEV. CODE
ANN. §§ 101.63, 106.03 (Vernon 1978 & Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-14, 32-7-15 (1974):
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (Supp. 1984): VA. CODE §4-62 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.270 (1962):
W.VA. CODE 60-3-22 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.07 (West Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101 (1981).
23E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23 (1982); IND. CODE ANN.
Winter, 19851 COMMENTS
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intoxicated persons,24 or to both. 5 If the courts could establish that these laws
were designed to protect injured third parties, the courts could find a duty on
the part of tavernkeepers - a violation constituting negligence per se.26
In 1958, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania followed this route in Schel-
in v. Goldberg," holding that the Pennsylvania Liquor Code could be used to
establish negligence per se on the part of a tavernkeeper who served a visibly
intoxicated patron. This holding enabled the patron to recover for injuries. The
Seventh Circuit went one step further in Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't
Store,2 holding that tavernkeepers were liable in tort for damages and injuries
sustained by third parties. This court also used a penal statute to establish
negligence per se29
The third and probably most cited landmark case is Rappaport v.
Nichols." In this case, a tavernkeeper sold alcohol to a minor. The minor
became intoxicated and caused an automobile accident in which Rappaport
died." The New Jersey legislature had earlier replaced the dram shop act with
a liquor control act, but the repeal left common law negligence principles
unimpaired. 2 The court cited Schelin and Waynick, and held that "[wihere a
tavernkeeper sells alcoholic beverages to a person who is visibly intoxicated or
to a person he knows or should know from the circumstances to be a minor, he
ought to recognize and foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others
through the action of the intoxicated person or the minor."33 The court noted
that the legislature had prohibited liquor sales to minors becaue it recognized
§ 7.1-5-7-8 (1982). The Georgia statute provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Except as otherwise authorized by
law: (1) No person knowingly, by himself or through another, shall furnish, cause to be furnished, or permit
any person in his employ to furnish any alcoholic beverage to any person under 19 years of age." GA. CODE
ANN. § 3-3-23 (1982).
24E.g. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:711 (West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22 (1982), providing: "No alcoholic
beverage shall be sold, bartered, exchanged, given, provided, or furnished to any person who is in a state of
noticeable intoxication."
"E.g., ALA. CODE § 28-7-21 (Supp. 1984): ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-529 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-128
(1978 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-86 (West Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 23-312 (1977). The Col-
orado statute provides, in pertinent part: "(I) It is unlawful for any person: (a) To sell, serve, give away,
dispose of, exchange, or deliver or permit the sale, serving, giving, or procuring of any malt, vinous, or
spiritous liquor to or for any person under the age of twenty-one years, to a visibly intoxicated person, or to a
known habitual drunkard." COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-128 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
"See infra p. 14.
2"188 Pa. Super. 341 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
n269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1966).
-ld. at 325-26.
-31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). This is the same court that recently recognized social host liability based on
common law negligence principles apart from a penal statute.
'lid. at 192, 156 A.2d at 3.
121d. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
31ld. Although the court ultimately relied upon a violation of a penal statute to find negligence per se, the
court was clearly articulating negligence standards apart from negligence per se. This reasoning laid the
groundwork for courts finding negligence on the part of tavernkeepers as well as social hosts apart from a
statute.
[Vol. 18:3
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the inherent danger which results when minors drink; the serving of alcohol to
the minor or intoxicated person creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the
minor, the intoxicated person, and the traveling public?' Thus, the liquor con-
trol statute protected the general public and a violation constituted negligence
per se.
The court dealt with the proximate cause obstacle by viewing the sale of
intoxicating beverages as a substantial factor in producing the injuries. 5
Realizing that it was making a major change in the law, the court stated:
[W]e are convinced that recognition of the plaintiffs claim will afford a
fairer measure of justice to innocent third parties whose injuries are
brought about by the unlawful and negligent sale of alcoholic beverages
to minors and intoxicated persons, will strengthen ane give greater force
to the enlightened statutory and regulatory precautions against such sales
and their frightening consequences, and will not place any unjustifiable
burdens upon defendants who can always discharge their civil respon-
sibilities by the exercise of due care. 6
Many courts followed the lead of Rappaport in abandoning the tradi-
tional common law rule. These courts reasoned that "the common law, which
is judge-made and judge-applied, can and will be changed when changed condi-
tions and circumstances establish that it is unjust or has become bad public
policy."37 Liability was imposed for personal injury" and death. 9 Some courts
expressly noted that the repeal of dram shop acts did not prevent this remedy.
40
Most courts used the penal liquor laws to establish negligence per se,1' reason-
ing that these statutes were enacted not only to protect the specific individual
from himself, but to protect the general public from the intoxicated
individual. 2 The courts also reasoned that the tavernkeeper can be a con-
tributing cause if the injury is foreseeable. 3 Some courts in states with dram
3
4 d.
'Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9.
111d. at 205, 156 A.2d at 10.
"Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983). See also McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666
P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
$See Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal Rptr. 623 (1971); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217
N.E.2d 847 (1966); See also Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d §3 528 (1980); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833 §6 (1961).
3 eeCimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323,431 N.E.2d 920 (1982); Adam ian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353
Mass. 498, 233 N.E. 2d 18 (1967); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Annot, 97 A.L.R.
3d, § 4 supra note 38.
"SeeAdamian. 353 Mass. at 500, 233 N.E.2d at 19; Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa.
626, 631, 198 A.2d 550, 553 (1964).
"See Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200; Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Mun-
ford, 368 So. 2d 213.
4'Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982); McClellan, 666 P.2d 408. Adamian. 353 Mass. 498,
233 N.E.2d 18.
4
'Nazareno v. Uric, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Ontiveros. 136 Ariz 500, 667 P. 2d 200; Ono, 62 Haw. 131,
612 P.2d 533; McClellan. 666 P.2d 408.
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shop acts also adopted this rule, holding that the dram shop act did not
preempt the field." Other states refused to recognize that violations of these
penal laws resulted in negligence per se, preferring to defer to the legislature to
impose liability. 45
Fewer courts were willing to extend a common law liability to tavernkeep-
ers apart from the penal statutes.' Many of these cases rested primarily on
violations of penal law and recognized negligence principles as an alternative
theory. Sorensen by Kerscher v. Jarvis47 is the most recent case to apply this
theory to tavernkeeper liability. The court refused to defer to the legislature,
which had recently failed to pass a bill imposing liability. The court also ad-
dressed policy reasons for the change in the common law.
Thus, the majority of jurisdictions have abrogated the traditional com-
mon law rule and have held tavernkeepers liable for the negligent acts of their
intoxicated patrons.48 The rationale for this change is clearly justified because
of the penal statutes and higher duties imposed on the proprietor engaged in
selling and furnishing alcohol.
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
Courts now recognized tavernkeeper liability by three separate methods:
the dram shop act, a liquor control statute, or common law negligence theories
apart from any statute. As a result of the trend toward changing the common
"Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965), Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294
N.E.2d 884 (19731: Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973).
'Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965): Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979):
Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 11976): Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450
P.2d 358 (1969): Yoscovitch v. Wasson, 645 P.2d 975 (Nev. 1982).
'Rappaport, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1: Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237,566 P.2d 893 1977): Colligan, 38
Ill. App.2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292.
" 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1984).
"The following states have abrogated the traditional common law rule of nonliability: Arizona: Ontiveros
136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200, Brannigan v. Raybrick, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983): Alaska: Nazareno.
638 P.2d 671: Colorado: Kerby v. The Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127, 532 P.2d 975 (1974):
Florida: Davis v. Shiappacosse, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963): but see Armstrong v. Munford, Inc., 451 So. 2d
480 (Fla. 1984), Migilore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, 448 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1984): Hawaii: Ono, 62 Haw.
131, 612 P.2d 533: Idaho: Algeria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); Indiana: Elder v. Fisher,
247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966): Iowa: Lewis v. State, 256 N.W. 2d 181 (Iowa 1977): Haafke v. Mitch-
ell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984); Kentucky: Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968): Massachusetts:
Adamian, 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18, Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc. 390 Mass. 6, 453
N.E.2d 430 (1983): Michigan: Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Minnesota:
Trail, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618: Mississippi: Munford, 368 So. 2d 213, Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.
2d 570 (Mo. App. 1983): New Hampshire: Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); New
Jersey: Rappaport, 31 N.J. 181, 156 A.2d I; New Mexico: Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269;
New York: Berkely, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290; Ohio: Mason, 33 Ohio St.2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884:
Oregon: Campbell, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893; Pennsylvania: Jardine, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550; South
Dakota: Walz, 327 N.W.2d 120; Tennessee: Brookins v. The Round Table, 624 S.W.2d 547 )Tenn. 198 1);
Washington: Callan v. O'Neill, 20 Wash. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978), Young v. Caravan Corporation, 99
Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983): Torres v. Salty Sea Days, Inc., 36 Wash. App. 668, 676 P.2d 512 (1984);
Wisconsin: Sorensen by Kerscher v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W. 2d 108 (1984); Wyoming: McClellan,
666 P.2d 408.
[Vol. 18:3
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law, victims of intoxicated individuals began suing gratuitous servers. Suits
arose where plaintiffs sued organizations, 9 and some dared to sue social hosts.
Since some of the suits involved intoxicated minors, courts imposed liability,
expressly confining the holdings to the facts of the case. The remainder of this
comment will discuss causes of action based on each of these theories.
DRAM SHOP ACTS
A cause of action alleging violation of a dram shop act is the weakest
route for a litigant to pursue. First, the legislative trend is to abolish these
statutes. Further, these statutes limit who may bring a cause of action and who
will be liable.5" Finally, some of the statutes limit the amount of recovery.' On-
ly three existing statutes unambiguously apply to a seller-licensee.52 The rest of
the statutes are worded very broadly, applying to "any person" who provides
alcohol. While the wording in these broad statutes could arguably apply to
social hosts, legislative action or judicial interpretation has limited these
statutes to sellers.
The interpretation of the Minnesota statute is a prime example. In Ross v.
Ross,53 the Minnesota Supreme Court construed the 1972 version of the civil
damages act to impose liability on social hosts. The court stated that "the
legislature intended to create a new cause of action against every violator
whether in the liquor business or not."54 The court recognized that "the
legislature envisioned [a] limited application of the Civil Damages Act to
householders and social drinkers,"55 but the court felt that changing times war-
ranted an expansive interpretation of this statute. 6 The Minnesota Legislature
overruled the Ross case by deleting the word "giving" from the statute in
1972,11 and the present statute still reflects this change. 8 Subsequent Min-
"Plaintiffs suing employers also use respondent superior as an alternative theory when employees host
business functions. See. Romeo v. Van Otterloo. 117 Mich. App. 333, 323 N.W.2d 693 (1982). This theory
might be easier to apply because the plaintiff must merely show that the employee was acting within the
scope of his employment. Id. at 337, 323 N.W.2d at 695.
-'The earlier statutes were far more limited on who could recover. Most of the modern statutes grant any
person who is injured the right to recover. See e.g.. ME. REV. SrAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 119831: MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 436.22 (West Supp. 19841.
"Few modern statutes place monetary limits on recovery. See e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983). Most statutes provide for recovery of actual exemplary damages. e.g. ALA. CODE § 6-5-71
(1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § I 1-101 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1983).
"IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West Supp. 1984):
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984).
"1294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 11972).
-'d. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53.
"1d. at 119, 200 N.W.2d at 151.
56d.
"See also Holmquist v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 47,50 (Minn. App. 19841.
"MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984).
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nesota cases have construed the statute not to apply to social hosts.59 A similar
situation occurred in Iowa when that state's supreme court applied the dram
shop act to a social host in Williams v. Klemesrud.? The court differentiated
other statutes which have been construed as penal in nature and therefore
strictly construed. The Iowa Legislature acted to overrule this case by amend-
ing the statute to only apply to licensees or permittees.6'
Other courts have held that the dram shop acts do not apply to gratuitous
providers of alcohol. Many commentators state that the courts limit these acts
to sellers:
(I) because the purpose of a dram shop act is to suppress illegal liquor sales
rather than to extend a remedy to injured parties, courts must strictly con-
strue the statute; (2) courts must base any judicial extension of the dram
shop act remedy on the historical facts that motivated the passage of the
act; (3) to avoid opening the "floodgates" of litigation, courts should defer
any extension of the remedy to the legislature.62
Of the states with dram shop acts today, courts in Illinois,61 Alabama, 6 New
York,65 and Ohio'M have held that these statutes do not apply to gratuitous
servers. Courts in two states which subsequently repealed the statutes made
the same holding. Some courts have used this finding to apply a common law
theory instead.68
Legislatures and courts are limiting the existing dram shop acts to
business proprietors. The statutes in New York and Illinois were amended in
1983;69 however, legislatures have chosen to retain this language despite
judicial opinions. Therefore, it appears that legislatures are content with these
judicial constructions which limit the acts.7 The Alabama Legislature has
5 Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982); Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836
(Minn. 1982); Holmquist, 352 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. App. 1984); Meany v. Newell, 352 N.W.2d 779 (Minn.
App. 1984).
f197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
"See. IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984).
"
2Note, supra note 12, at 454.
3E.g.. Cruse v. Aden, 127 III. 231, 20 N.E. 72 (1889); Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842
(1983): Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 111. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
"DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979).
6'Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856,452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Edgar v. Kajet, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389
N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1976) (mem).
6Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49, American Legion, Inc., II Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d
521 (1984).
6'Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972); Wiener v. Gamma Phi
Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
"See e.g.. Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978); Wiener, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
69ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § I 1-101 (McKinney 1978
& Supp. 19831.
"See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 I(Supp. 19841 and ALA. CODE § 28-7-21 (Supp. 19841.
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Winter, 19851
limited a civil cause of action to a person who violates a liquor control act. The
liquor control act is limited to licensees. The Alaska Legislature has enacted a
similar act. According to Alaska statute § 04.21.020, in pertinent part:
A person who provides alcoholic beverages to another person may not be
held civilly liable for injuries resulting from the intoxication of that person
unless the person who provides the alcoholic beverages holds a license...
or is an agent or employee of such a licensee and
(1) the alcoholic beverages are provided to a person under the age of 21
years in violation of AS 04.16.051, unless the licensee, agent, or employee
secures in good faith from the person a signed statement, liquor identifica-
tion card, or driver's license ... that indicates that the person is 21 years
of age or older; or
(2) the alcoholic beverages are provided to a drunken person in viola-
tion of AS 04.16.030. 71
Colorado, 2 California," and Pennsylvania' have enacted "negative" dram
shop acts which state that licensees will not be held civilly liable for furnishing
the alcohol. Some courts have not spoken. But it appears from the ones that
have spoken that social hosts will not be included in the dram shop acts. Thus,
the injured victim must search for another way to state his claim.
NEGLIGENCE PER SE
According to fundamental tort law, the elements of a cause for negligence
are the following: 1) a legal duty or obligation that requires the person to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks; 2) a breach of the duty by this person; 3) the breach of the
duty as proximate cause of the injury; and 4) damage resulting to the interests
of another." It is also fundamental that violation of a statute may constitute
negligence per se.' 6 According to Section 286 of the Restatement of Torts:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
and
"ALASKA STAT. § 04.2 1.020 (Supp. 1984).
"COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1974).
"CA. BUS.& PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984), CA. CIVIL CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1984).
14PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1969).
"KEETON. PROSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 165 (1984) [hereinafter cited Keetonl.
'"Id at 238.
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(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.77
As a result of a finding of negligence per se, the defendant will be deemed as a
matter of law to have breached his duty.78 The plaintiff must still prove prox-
imate cause and injury. 9
Some of the courts have considered the possibility of using penal liquor
control acts to constitute negligence per se by the social host. These alleged
causes of action probably arose because many of the statutes contain very
broad language, 0 because causes of actions based on violations of dram shop
acts generally failed, and because parties took hints from the trend of applying
these statutes in cases involving liquor establishments. However, there is a ma-
jor problem in applying these statutes to social hosts. In order for a statute to
be used, the plaintiff and the risk must be covered by the statute."' In general,
courts have practiced judicial restraint and have not exceeded the purpose of
the statute. 2
Twenty-two states have penal statutes containing language which clearly
applies only to taverns serving intoxicated adults,83 and twenty-five contain
specific language for taverns serving minors. "4 Fourteen states have statutes
containing broad language that could reasonably include either sellers or
gratuitous providers of alcohol to intoxicated individuals,85 and seventeen
states' statutes contain broad language concerning servers of minors.86 Since
the majority of these statutes prohibit sales to minors, differences in the
statutes of a particular state permit courts to impose liability in cases involving
minors and to avoid doing so where victims are injured by intoxicated adults.
It may be that, for reasons of public policy, courts want to impose liability on
servers of minors but not on servers of adults. By resorting to a negligence per
se analysis alone, courts are establishing the legislature's perogative to indicate
"RESTATEMENT. (SECONDI OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
7 Keeton, supra note 75, at 230.
791d.
'See Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests.
16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 561, 571 (1980) thereinafter cited Graham].
"'Keeton, supra note 75, at 222.
?Id. The class of protected persons may be very broad. The court must interpret the statutory terms in light
of the evils to be remedied. Id. at 225.
"Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See supra note 22, for citations to statutes.
"Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See supra note 22, for citations to statutes.
"California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania. See supra note 22, for citations.
"Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee. See supra note 22, for citations.
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whom the server has the duty to protect third parties from. In this way, courts
are avoiding having to establish liability on common law theories. According
to one commentator:
A social host more easily can detect and control the drunkenness of a
minor than of an adult. Furthermore, a minor is identified more readily as
a high risk individual who is more likely to cause an accident. Thus, the
risk created when a social host serves liquor to a minor should be more ap-
parent to the social host and should create a more stringent duty owed by
the social host to others who might be injured. 7
The major difficulty in applying the liquor control statutes is that the
statute must apply to the defendant. While most liquor control acts discussed
above obviously apply to licensees or tavernkeepers, it is questionable whether
they apply to social hosts. It is possible these statutes protect against the con-
duct of social hosts when the statutes contain the broad language, but not all
statutes contain this language. Further, courts and legislatures have limited
the language to apply only to commercial vendors. Battles between the courts
and legislatures have resulted.
Courts refusing to recognize a common law rule of negligence on the basis
of a penal statute generally hold that the dram shop act supplies the exclusive
remedy. These courts reason that the imposition of liability is the responsibility
of the legislature. A majority of these courts have addressed facts where an
employer or social host serves an intoxicated adult.8 Some cases expressly
distinguish these facts from facts in cases in which a minor is involved,89 the
court leaving the door open in a case involving a minor.
Four states have refused to extend the state's penal liquor laws to impose
liability on a gratuitous server.9° Two of these cases involved social hosts,"' one
involved an employer, 92 and one involved a veteran's post.93 The result in these
cases has been a determination that the statute does not apply to the defen-
dant. For example, in Kohler v. Wray,94 a New York Supreme Court refused
to apply a liquor control statute to a homeowner who provided beer to an in-
toxicated adult. Although the statute provided that no person shall give away
"Graham, supra note 80, at 581.
uE.g. Miller v. Moran, 96 111. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219,
175 N.W.2d 303 (1970).
"E.g. DeLoach, 378 So. 2d 733; Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80 (D.C.D.C. 1978); Miller, 96 Ill.
App.3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046(1981); Archer v. Burton, 91 Mich. App. 57, 282 N.W.2d 833(1979); LeGault
v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967); Runge, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145; Edgar, 55
A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631.
"E.g., Runge, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145; Kohler, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Set-
tleryer, II Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521; Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
"Kohler, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831; Runge, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145.
"Manning, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75.
'
3Settlemyer, I I Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521.
"114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1982).
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the alcohol, the New York courts had uniformly held that the statute does not
apply to a host in a noncommercial setting." The Montana Supreme Court, in
Runge v. Watts," thought it was the duty of the legislature to provide a
remedy. The court noted that there is a greater justification for imposing
liability on a commercial rather than on a social purveyor, first because of the
need to check on the pecuniary motives of the one engaged in business, and
second, because a commercial vendor is in a better position to observe
customers and monitor level of intoxication.97 However, Montana is one of the
states which has not adopted a new common law rule of nonliability of liquor
vendors. It is not surprising that the court held this way.
At least four legislatures have reacted to their state court's holdings of
social host liability by amending their liquor control laws or dram shop
statutes." The actions of the California courts and the legislature are a prime
example of what has occurred. In Strang v. Cabrol,99 the Supreme Court of
California addressed a conflict in the appeals courts over whether civil liability
for personal injuries may be predicated on the sale or furnishing of alcoholic
beverages to a minor who is not obviously intoxicated.'" The conflict arose
from a history of court opinions and legislative amendments. Prior to the
amendments, the California courts had imposed liability on social hosts in a
variety of situations. In Vesely v. Sager,'0' the supreme court applied section
25602 of the Business and Professions Code to find negligence per se of a tav-
ernkeeper who served an intoxicated adult. The court stated that the statute
was enacted to protect members of the general public from intoxicated persons
and damage to property resulting from the excessive use of alcohol. In
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co.,'0 2 an appeals court expanded the Vesely
ruling to cover an employer who served liquor to a minor employee at a
Christmas party. The court stated that "the impeccable logic of Vesely impels
the conclusion that any person, whether he is in the business of dispensing
alcoholic beverages or not, who disregards the legislative mandate breaches a
duty to anyone who is injured as a result of the minor's intoxication and for
whose benefit the statute was enacted."'' 3 In Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,"°4 the
"See also Setlemyer, I I Ohio St.2d 123,464 N.E. 2d 521. In Holmes v. Circo 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65
(1976), and Hamm v. Carson City Nuggett, Inc. 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358(1969), the Nebraska and Nevada
courts stated in dicta that the penal statutes could not be applied in a civil setting. The facts in these cases in-
volved a tavernkeeper.
'180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979).
'"d., 180 Mont. at 94, 589 P.2d at 147. The Ohio court also made this distinction in Settlemyer.
"ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (Supp. 1984); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE
ANN. § 7.1-5-7-8 (West 1982); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983).
" P.2d , 209 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1984).
"Ould
1"5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P. 2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1972).
11224 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 1972).
'124 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
"1 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
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supreme court indicated that while Vesely relied upon a statutory violation to
make out a breach of duty of care, "there was no bar to civil liability under
modern negligence law ' ' 01 against a defendant commercially providing alcohol
to an obviously intoxicated person. Finally, in Coulter v. Superior Court of
San Mateo County,'I the California Supreme Court applied the liquor control
statute to a social host.
The California Legislature reacted to these rulings by amending the stat-
ute, expressly overruling these cases. The general principle of section 1714 of
the Civil Code1 7 providing that everyone is responsible for his own negligent or
willful acts is now qualified by subdivision (b) and (c). According to these sub-
divisions:
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holings in cases such
as Vesely v. Sager. .. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club . . . and Coulter v.
Superior Court and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this sec-
tion as it relates to proximate cause for injuries incurred as a result of fur-
nishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that the fur-
nishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries
resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic
beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an
intoxicated person.
(c) No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall
be held legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for in-
jury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting
from the consumption of such beverages. '
The legislature also amended section 25602 of the Business and Professions
Code, 19 a liquor control statute governing the furnishing of alcohol to any
"habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person." Sub-
division (c) is similar to 1714(b), and subdivision (b) now provides that no per-
son who commits a misdemeanor pursuant to subdivision (a) ". . . shall be civil-
ly liable to any injured person ... for injuries inflicted on that person as a
result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage."" 0 Finally,
section 25658 is a liquor control act governing liquor sales to minors, but this
statute contains no express civil immunity to the provider."'
In Strang v. Cabrol, the plaintiff argued that a commercial vendor could
be held liable for selling liquor to a minor who was not obviously intoxicated at
'101d. at 325, 546 P.2d at 726, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
1 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
"'CA. CIVIL CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1984).
"NId.
'"CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984).
"Id.
'CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West 1984).
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the time of sale on negligence per se principles because Section 25658 contains
no express civil immunity comparable to that contained in Section 25602.112
The court refused to engage in statutory construction which we have seen in
the area and concluded that the sweeping civil immunity provided by the 1978
amendments was intended to encompass this situation."' The court applied
maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius.114 According to this rule of construc-
tion, an express exclusion from the operation of a statute indicates that the
legislature intended no other exceptions are to be implied."' In this case, Sec-
tion 25602.1 created the single statutory exception for sales by a licensee to an
obviously intoxicated minor. The court stated that "[i]f the Legislature had in-
tended also to exclude sales to sober, underage persons from the reach of the
superseding statute, it could have said so directly by amending Section 25658
to that effect."" 6 After a history of debate on this issue, the California courts
and legislature are reaching agreement. Other legislatures have not reacted to
these holdings. In Brattain v. Herron,"7 an Indiana appeals court used a liquor
control statute to hold liable a sister who furnished alcohol to her minor
brother. This decision is still law.
Whereas the legislatures are overruling supreme court cases imposing
liability, lower courts are rejecting the supreme court rulings of nonliability.
Two recent decisions have carved out exceptions to the state's existing rule
that penal statutes do not apply in social settings. In these recent cases, the
lower courts are searching, in the dicta of supreme court cases, for supporting
language to impose liability. In Holmquist v. Miller,"' a Minnesota appeals
court made an exception to the existing rule that the dram shop act preempted
the field in a claim of negligence against a social host who served an adult. In
this court's view, the floor debates of the dram shop act do not demonstrate
that the legislature intended the statute to preempt the field in the case of
minors." ' The court also referred to dicta in subsequent supreme court cases to
support the imposition of liability. The statutory interpretation in this case is
questionable in light of the existing rule that the dram shop act preempts the
field. Once a court interprets whether a dram shop act applies to social hosts, it
should apply the rule to both minors and adults. Any difference must rest sole-
ly on policy reasons. In fact the court did resort to policy, stating that
M P.2d , 209 Cal. Rptr. 347, 349 (19841.
"'ld. at 352.
"'Id. at 350.
"'The court cites 2A SUTHERLAND. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 50.01, pp. 268-69 (4th ed. 1973).
"'Strang, 209 Cal. Rptr. at.
"159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974). See also Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa.
1973).
."352 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. App. 1984). The court looked to language in Walker v. Kennedy, 338 N.W.2d 254
(Minn. 1983) which implied that there might be a cause of action against a social host. However, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court has not made a definitive ruling on the issue.
"'Holmquist, 352 N.W.2d at 51.
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[olur decision allowing a cause of action also comports with sound public
policy. The legislature has recognized that minors should be prevented
from purchasing, possessing, or drinking alcoholic beverages .... Social
policy dictates that individuals who procure intoxicating liquor for minors
be held liable for damages caused by the intoxicated minor. The social ills
from intoxication are grossly aggravated when minors are involved
because of their documented inability to cope properly with intoxicating
liquor. Imposing civil liability discourages the illegal furnishing of liquor
to minors; thus, it serves to promote our strong public policy of preventing
our youth from causing senseless damage to themselves and the public. 2
In Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 2' a Michigan appeals court engaged in
statutory construction in deciding a case where a social host served a minor.
The parties had stipulated that a repealed penal statute would have provided a
civil cause of action. 22 However, the state supreme court had held that the
revised statute did not provide a cause of action against the private server of an
adult. Since the legislature had retained the "giving" and "furnishing"
language, 23 the appeals court found that the civil cause of action was retained
in the case of a minor."' According to the court:
[Wle believe that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the misde-
meanor offense attendant to the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to
minors by persons other than licensees under the Liquor Control Act. We
note that the Legislature chose to use the word "person" as opposed to re-
tailer, vendor, or licensee in regard to the prohibition against knowingly
selling or furnishing liquor to a person who has not attained 21 years of
age. 25
These examples are evidence of a will to avoid existing rules by distinguishing
the serving of a minor from that of an adult. Although the results may be
desirous for policy reasons, they are legally inconsistent from a statutory con-
struction viewpoint. At least one court has refused to make such a distinction.
In Wilson v. Steinbach, 26 the court refused to make such a distinction depend-
ing upon the identity of the victim because the relevant inquiry is whether a
standard of care has been breached and not whether the intoxicated person has
been an adult or a minor.
Courts find little difficulty in applying penal statutes which clearly apply
'"Id. at 52.
, 125 Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d 677 1983). Michigan does not apply the adult penal statute to establish
negligence per se. See Manuel v. Weitzman. 386 Mich. 157. 191 N.W.2d 474 119711: Hollerud v. Malamis.
20 Mich. App. 748. 174 N.W.2d 626 (1969).
-':Longstreth, 335 N.W. 2d at 678.
'ICMH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 436.33 (West Supp. 1984).
"'Longstreth. 335 N.W. 2d at 679.
1251d.
98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
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to the violator. In Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Jennings, 27 the court imposed liabili-
ty on an adult who purchased alcohol for a minor. The court used a penal
statute which made it unlawful to purchase liquor for a minor. In Sneath v.
Popiolek,28 a Michigan appeals court applied a statute which prohibited the
consumption of alcoholic beverages on public highways and the transportation
of an open bottle to impose liability on a passenger who supplied alcohol to an
intoxicated driver.
This confusion indicates that courts should avoid applying these penal
statutes in a private setting, especially in an area so heavily regulated by the
legislature. Courts are struggling to interpret these statutes. The clear trend is
to hold that the statutes do not apply to social hosts. According to one com-
mentator on the interpretation of criminal statutes, "the obvious conclusion
must usually be that when the legislators said nothing about it, they either did
not have the civil suit in mind at all, or deliberately omitted to provide for it."'29
Furthermore, many of these statutes appear in the liquor industry statutory
sections. Some legislatures are reacting by writing clearer statutes. California is
probably the extreme.
COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES
The final way to impose liability on a social host is to plead negligence
regardless of a penal statute. Once the court establishes that a dram shop act
does not preempt the field, this theory is the best way to impose liability. It
enables the court to avoid statutory construction by establishing that a social
host owes a general duty to the victim. Traditional negligence principles im-
pose a duty to control the conduct of another if there is some relationship be-
tween the parties.'30 The defendant breaches the duty by failing to take precau-
tions against the negligence of another if "a reasonable person would recognize
the existence of an unreasonable risk of harm to others through the third per-
son's negligence."''
The duty becomes most obvious if the actor "has reason to know that he
is dealing with persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that they
will do unreasonable things."'32 The court must then multiply the probability
that negligence will occur by the multitude of harm likely to result, and it must
weigh the result against the burden upon the defendant of exercising such
care.' The duty of a social host can be found under these principles because
1 427 So. 2d 1329 1La. App. 1983).
1- 135 Mich. App. 17, 352 N.W.2d 331 (19841.
'2"Keeton. supra note 75. at 221. The inquiry into a statute's "implied" or "presumed" intent to provide tort
liahility has been called a pure fiction. Id.
1'd. at 202.
"'Id. at 199.
'-Id. at 199.
131d.
[Vol. 18:3
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 18 [1985], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol18/iss3/6
the host who serves an intoxicated guest can reasonably foresee that the guest
may be involved in an accident. Certainly, the burden on the host to take
precautions is not too high because the host can drive the guest home or ar-
range for a ride."" Although the negligence theory applies, courts may refuse
to use it for various reasons. The court might leave the imposition of liability to
the legislature or the court's judgment might expressly or implicitly be govern-
ed by public policy reasons. One commentator has offered the following reason
for not imposing liability on social hosts:
First, it is unclear that the social host is as aware of the risks involved with
serving alcohol to high risk individuals as the vendor. Second, the social
host cannot control the service of alcohol as effectively as the vendor.
Thus, the statutes create a standard which would unfairly expose the
social host to liability."5
In Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc.," 6 the Supreme Court of
Washington refused to adopt a common law rule of liability against an
employer. Instead, the court deferred to the legislature. However, in dicta the
court discussed an exception for people who serve "obviously intoxicated per-
sons."'37 A Washington appeals court in Halligan v. Pupo 38 used this language
and applied it as a recognized exception to the rule of nonliability. Penn-
sylvania courts have done similar things. In Klein v. Raysinger,39 a Penn-
sylvania superior court held that a host who served an intoxicated adult could
not be liable at common law. On the same day, the same court in Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co." 0 held an employer liable for serving a minor. Another
superior court applied the Klein holding where an adult became intoxicated at
a non-commercial social event sponsored by the Ireland Athletic Association
on the premises of the Knights of Columbus."' However, the court limited its
holding to a purely social gathering sponsored by a non-commercial organiza-
tion, and left the door open for a case where the organization opens its doors to
the general public and/or receives consideration for the liquor served, even if it
does not hold a license under the liquor code."'
The courts which do impose liability on gratuitous servers ignore legisla-
tive action or inaction because the courts feel it is within their province to ap-
ply common law principles. Not surprisingly, the first case to do so involved a
"1Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. App. 1983).
"'Graham, supra note 80, at 577. The author ultimately concluded that the proximate cause and duty
analysis should be reexamined. Id.
-676 Wash.2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
"'d. at 763, 458 P.2d at 900.
"'37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295 (1984).
"302 Pa. Super. 248, 448 A.2d 620 11982), affd. 470 A.2d 507 11983).
"'470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 19831.
"'Sites v. Cloonan, 477 A.2d 547 (Pa. Super. 1984).
"lid. at 548, n.2.
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minor and an organization. In Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity, ' 3 the plaintiff sued a fraternity for injuries sustained when
an intoxicated minor drove into a building and injured the plaintiff - a pas-
senger in the car. The court held that the fraternity was negligent because the
fraternity conducted the party, invited minors, and served alcoholic
beverages.'" The fraternity's "status as host and its direct involvement in serv-
ing liquor""'4 to the minor was sufficient to impose a duty to prevent the minor
from causing an unreasonable risk. In 1979 the Oregon Legislature took mat-
ters in hand by enacting specific statutes. Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.960 now provides
".... no licensee, permittee or social host shall be liable to third persons injured
by or through persons not having reached 21 years of age ... unless it is dem-
onstrated that a reasonable person would have determined that identification
should have been requested .... ."" The state has enacted a similar statute es-
tablishing the liability of a private host who serves a visibly intoxicated guest.
4 7
While these statutes do not overrule the Wiener decision, they do limit it.
At present, New Jersey has developed the most far-reaching rule of liabili-
ty.'48 The state began the trend for finding liability against tavernkeepers in
Rappaport, and it has now extended the rule to private social hosts as well. An
examination of the decisions discloses that the state's courts feel strongly about
this rule and intend to keep it. As yet, the legislature has not overruled the
decisions.
In Linn v. Rand,' a New Jersey Superior Court used its reasoning from
Rappaport to hold that a social host who serves excessive amounts of alcohol
to a visibly intoxicated minor, knowing that the minor is about to drive a car
on public highways, could reasonably foresee or anticipate an accident or in-
jury as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his negligence in serving the
minor.'58 The court articulated its strong feelings by stating "[tihe fact that a
plaintiff may have a heavier burden of proof to carry when his suit is against a
social host, does not warrant granting such host immunity from liability."'' In
1982, a New Jersey trial court held that a social host is liable for furnishing
alcohol to an obviously intoxicated adult, but this case was never appealed.' 2
258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971),
'"The court first found that the individual fraternity member was not liable under negligence per se prin-
ciples and that none of the defendants were liable under the dram shop act. However, the court found that
the dram shop act did not preempt the field. The court also refused to hold the rental hall owners liable for
providing only the facility.
"'Wiener. 258 Or. at 637, 485 P.2d at 23.
'OR. REV. STAT. § 30.960 (1981).
'"See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 11981).
'"The California courts also developed the rule in Coulter, 21 Cal.3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
119781, but the legislature subsequently overruled the case.
'4140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 11976).
1"id.. 140 N.J. Super. at 219, 356 A.2d at 19.
1'1d., 140 N.J. Super. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
'
2Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 11982).
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Many courts and commentators speculated about the ramifications of the rul-
ings and the state of the law in New Jersey. The California cases had been
overruled and the Wiener case involved an organization. New Jersey was the
first state in which the legislature did not restrict or overrule the decision to
hold a social host liable on negligence theories.
In the summer of 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court answered these
questions in Kelly v. Gwinnel. 53 In this case, Donald Gwinnell stopped at
Joseph Zak's house for a drink after Gwinnell drove Zak home."' The
testimony disclosed that Gwinnell spent an hour or two at Zak's home, during
which time Zak served him two or three drinks of scotch. 5 Zak walked with
Gwinnell to his car, and Zak watched Gwinnell drive away. 56 On his way
home Gwinnell was involved in a head-on collision.'57 Tests disclosed that he
had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.286 percent.'58 An expert concluded
.that Gwinnell had not consumed two or three scotches but rather the
equivalent of thirteen drinks, that he showed unmistakable signs of intoxica-
tion, and that he was in fact severely intoxicated while at Zak's home and at
the time of the accident." 9
The court held that a social host who allows an adult guest at his home to
become drunk is liable to the victim for an automobile accident caused by the
drunken driving of the guest. 6 New Jersey has no dram shop act and past
New Jersey cases extended the liability only to gratuitous servers of minors.'
6
'
Thus, this court could not take the same approach of other courts regarding
the exclusivity of dram shop acts. The court also dismissed any claim that this
issue is solely for the legislature.
62
The court reasoned that immunization of hosts is not a result of
negligence law because negligence concepts clearly apply. 63 Under the present
facts, the social host provided the guest with liquor knowing that the guest
would be driving home. "[Olne could reasonably conclude that the Zaks must
have known that their provision of liquor was causing Gwinnell to become
drunk.""' Further, the court rejected any distinction between licensees and
15396 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
1141d. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
1551d.
'.ld.
1'7d.
1Id.
1Id.
1111d. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
011d. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221.
1611d. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226. The court also distinguished cases in other jurisdictions which have left the
decision to the legislature. The court did so because most of those states have dram shop acts. Id. at 552, 476
A.2d at 1227.
"6Id. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221.
'Id.
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social hosts.
After applying the negligence principles, the court allowed policy con-
siderations to govern its holding. The court stated:
[Wihile we recognize the concern that our ruling will interfere with ac-
cepted standards of social behavior; will intrude on and somewhat
diminish the enjoyment, relaxation, and camaraderie that accompany
social gatherings at which alcohol is served; and that such gatherings and
social relationships are not simply tangential benefits of a civilized society
but are regarded by many as important, we believe that the added
assurance of just compensation to the victim of drunken driving as well as
the added deterrent effect of the rule on such driving outweigh the impor-
tance of those other values.'65
This decision was clearly motivated by the war on drunken driving and
the trend in New Jersey toward imposing liability. Much of the language re-
sembles that of Rappaport. The court was not overly concerned with statistics,
stating that it believed that there was "change" in social attitudes and customs
concerning drinking"' and that this decision was consistent with the change.
There are many implications in this decision. It will be difficult to inter-
pret the phrase "directly serves" and to determine whether a host has control
of individuals at a party. At least one court has refused to impose liability on a
social host who provided liquor to an uninvited guest.'67 Another court refused
to hold liable a sister who permitted her younger sister to host a party where
minors would be present.'68 These considerations have already caused courts to
distinguish between business-employer hosts and social hosts.69 These courts
feel more comfortable with imposing liability because the employer is involved
in a master-servant relationship with its employees. However, one thing is
clear in New Jersey. The state's courts intend to stand by the decision. The
same court has already referred to the decision as an indication of the "clear
public policy of this State" to rid the highways of drunken drivers."'10 Also, in
Davis v. Sam Goody Inc., ' a New Jersey appeals court relied on Kelly to hold
a commercial host liable to a third party for damages as a result of an intoxicat-
ed guest. The court stated that "tilt is abundantly clear to us that liability in
this State depends not on the nature or character of the supplier of the alcohol-
ic beverage nor on whether the tort-feasor is a minor or an adult. Rather,
liability depends upon 'conventional negligence analysis' respecting
1,5ld. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1224.
1"Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1229.
'7Heldt v. Brei. 118 Ill. App. 3d 798. 455 N.E.2d 842 1983).
"*Walker v. Kennedy, 338 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 19831.
'Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F. 2d 957 14th Cir. 1982) cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983).
1'State v. Dyal. 97 N.J. 229, 478 A.2d 390, 394 11984).
"'195 N.J. Super. 423, 480 A.2d 212 11984).
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foreseeability."'
Courts will resolve this issue differently and many courts uncomfortable
with this holding will continue to make distinctions. The Kelly decision
developed from a clear trend within the jurisdiction, but it is unclear whether
or not other states with dram shop acts or states which do not recognize a com-
mon law rule of negligence of business proprietors will adopt this rule.
However, the common law theory is the best theory because it is totally consis-
tent with negligence principles. Unless the New Jersey legislature speaks on
the issue, the decision will stand.
CONCLUSION
It is improbable that we will see a majority rule ermerge on this issue.
While the imposition of liability on liquor licensees is more justifiable, courts
will be forced to weigh the policy concerns against drunk driving and public in-
toxication, and the policy of holding a purely private individual liable for the
accident of a guest. The courts and legislatures must act on this issue.
Legislatures should clarify statutes. In states where legislatures do not do so,
courts wishing to impose liability should apply common law theories and
thereby avoid statutory construction problems. But as long as these accidents
occur, it is probable that state courts and legislatures will continue to dispute
the issue.
ELIZABETH A. LEVIN
111195 N.J. Super. at 424, 480 A.2d at 213.
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